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Key Points 
 
 The management of relations between China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Brunei, who all claim the Spratly Islands either completely 
or in part, is an important indicator for the nature of future relations in the 
region. The dispute is a particularly sensitive issue due to the strategic 
importance of the South China Sea. It contains major sea-lanes including 
some of the busiest shipping routes in the world. Most contentiously, it is 
widely speculated that the Spratlys sit atop vast deposits of oil and gas.  
 
 Tensions rose in 2010 due to an apparent return to assertiveness by China 
that drew the US into the dispute. In March it was reported that the Chinese 
told the US that the South China Sea was a ‘core interest’ related to its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity (which puts it at the same level as Taiwan 
and Tibet). The Americans responded through statements by both the 
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State re-iterating the US position that it 
considers freedom of navigation through the South China Sea as a matter of 
‘national interest’ and would oppose the use or threat of use of force by any 
claimant.  
 
 How the dispute develops will provide a clearer indication as to the type of 
state that China intends to be in the region and the nature of the China-US 
relationship.  
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Introduction 
The management of relations between the various claimants to the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea and over the Spratly Islands1 in particular, 
are important indicators for the nature of future relations in the region. China, 
Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all claim the Spratlys 
either completely or in part. The dispute is a particularly sensitive issue due to 
the strategic importance of the South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in 
particular. The South China Sea contains major sea-lanes of communications 
including some of the busiest shipping routes in the world. It also holds 
important natural resources such as vast fishing grounds and large deposits of 
valuable minerals. Most contentiously, it is also widely speculated that the 
Spratly Islands and their adjacent waters sit atop vast deposits of oil and gas.2 
The 1988 clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces over Chinese 
occupation of six of the features in the group demonstrates the potential for 
military conflict over the Islands.3 
Tensions over the dispute have risen over the past few years due to an 
apparent return to assertiveness by China over the issue. US-China relations 
have also suffered with diplomatic accusations exchanged by both sides. This 
paper explores the security implications of the territorial disputes over the 
Spratly Islands. I argue that the dispute is a good test to assess the nature of 
the role of China in the region and indeed globally. Following a period of 
tensions from 1988 to the mid-1990s, China has, over the past decade, 
embarked on a period of engagement with Southeast Asian states in general 
and with the other claimants in particular. Over the past year, however, 
China’s relations with these states has deteriorated with some commentators 
announcing the end of the so-called ‘Charm Offensive’.4 China’s actions, as 
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the largest claimant as well as a potential regional hegemon, are 
understandably the focus of many of the regional actors even though the other 
claimants have made similarly provocative moves since 1995, when China’s 
occupation of Mischief Reef was discovered5, such as occupying features, 
building lighthouses, airstrips and even diving resorts in the disputed area. 
 
Diplomatic Approaches to Security in the South China Sea 
Over the past 15 years a series of diplomatic approaches to preserve regional 
peace and stability through the gradual adoption of confidence- and security-
building mechanisms have been initiated. In the South China Sea this 
approach has had some success in reducing the level of enmity among the 
littoral states through the creation of joint development projects and increased 
transparency in foreign and defence policies of the various claimants. In 1994 
the then Philippine President, Fidel Ramos argued for the increase in inter-
governmental contacts, as well as joint resource development in the Spratlys 
in order to reduce tension in the region. Following a meeting with the then 
Vietnamese Prime Minister, Ramos reported on the two countries acceptance 
of this cooperative approach. ‘We agreed on the need to devise confidence-
building mechanisms - cooperative ventures in the area - that will assure the 
claimant countries and the rest of the region that the South China Sea can be 
transformed from waters of contention to an area of cooperation’. Elaborating 
on this statement, the then Philippine undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Rodolfo Severino stated that this confidence-building would be conducted in 
the Asian way, which is ‘gradual, step by step, in a consensual manner.’ He 
added that the two leaders also agreed to encourage a wide range of informal 
contacts between the claimants. These would range from the national leaders 
to local military commanders.6  
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Chinese Engagement post-Asian Financial Crisis 
While China in the past has been reluctant to engage in multilateral regional 
security approaches this changed following the 1998 launch of its ‘New 
Security Strategy’. In this the Chinese advocated an approach to safeguard its 
independence and sovereignty by creating an international environment 
favourable to its economic reforms and modernisation efforts, and to maintain 
world peace and foster common developments. As a result China has 
instigated what many called a ‘Charm Offensive’, (or what The Economist 
refers to as ‘Smile Diplomacy’) with the Southeast Asian states.7 Renato Cruz 
De Castro argues that this represents a Chinese policy of being a ‘cooperative 
hegemon’. Cooperative hegemons seek to neutralize the balance of power 
mechanism through cooperation rather than counter-balancing acts. ‘Faced 
with a more powerful hegemon with more resources and a powerful military, a 
cooperative hegemon will not form a counter-hegemonic coalition. Rather, it 
may set up a formalized cooperative regional substructure to neutralize the 
more powerful traditional hegemon’.8 The strategy of a cooperative hegemon 
is to use economic influence such as the granting of favours to small states 
through side-payments. The cooperative hegemon will also allow some 
political freedom for the smaller states by giving them a ‘seat at the table’ in 
an asymmetrical regional organisation. China achieves this through promoting 
ASEAN access to China’s growing economy, increased Chinese political and 
economic engagement with the ASEAN states through the ASEAN plus Three 
and ASEAN Regional Forum.9 
While in the past the Chinese were fearful of smaller states using multilateral 
fora to punish and constrain China, the Chinese are increasingly adept at 
using these fora to advance their policy objectives throughout Asia but with 
the Southeast Asian states in particular. In overcoming this fear of 
multilateralism the Chinese have had to ignore or rise above their political 
culture and national historical experiences that made them reluctant to 
engage in multilateral regional security organisations. In the South China Sea, 
China was especially concerned over three trends. First, many of the littoral 
states were increasing their military procurement with a particular focus to 
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extend their maritime capabilities. This was occurring for several reasons such 
as the reduction in the US presence in the region, their economic recovery 
from the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis and the increased role and 
responsibility that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives 
the littoral states over their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs). Second, China was concerned with the ASEAN states’ preference to 
internationalize the dispute. For the Chinese they felt that by including the 
South China Sea disputes on the agenda of international fora such as the 
ARF the dispute became much more internationalised. By including regional 
and extra-regional powers such as the US, Japan, Canada and the European 
Union in the discussion there was a concern that international sympathy 
would be with the smaller claimants. China was also concerned with the 
ASEAN states’ attempts to draw the United States and Japan more directly 
into the dispute. This played into the Chinese fears that the United States was 
seeking to reassert its hegemony in the region with the ultimate goal of 
‘containing’ China. Third, China feared the other claimants were in collusion 
with one another to restrict Chinese interests in the region.10  
China’s previous reluctance to internationalise the dispute was evident 
following the discovery of the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994. 
China turned down the Filipino proposal to host a multilateral conference on 
the Spratlys and said it would only consider bilateral negotiations with the 
individual claimants. One reason that China was reluctant to internationalise 
the dispute is that the Chinese leadership felt that China was unjustly branded 
the aggressor in the South China Sea. In 1995 Qian Qichen, the then Chinese 
foreign minister, sought to allay concerns in the region over a perceived 
Chinese drive for hegemony. He highlighted China’s desire to play a positive 
role in maintaining regional peace and stability. Qian stated that ‘China will 
never threaten or invade other countries. Instead, it will always be a positive 
factor for world peace and development’.11 China does not consider itself the 
aggressor in the South China Sea in that it has only relatively recently 
pursued its national interests in the area. Rather, China’s enemies took 
advantage of Chinese weakness in the past to press their claims in the region. 
Moreover, the others have continued to increase their occupation and control 
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of parts of the disputed area while talking about the need for a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute.12 
The Chinese were slow in accepting the multilateral approach as there was a 
great deal of uncertainty among the Chinese decision makers between not 
wanting to be isolated in the region while at the same time not wanting to give 
in on historical national issues. This ambiguity can be seen in a much-quoted 
1992 statement by Qian Qichen where he stated, ‘We can seek a solution to 
these issues through negotiations. When conditions are ripe, we can start 
negotiations. When negotiations are not ripe, we can shelve these disputes’.13 
While at the time this was seen as evidence of Chinese aggressive intentions 
in the region, it can also be interpreted to indicate unwillingness by the 
Chinese to press the sovereignty issue when the other claimant states were 
galvanised in their opposition to China. When this occurs, Qian argues, the 
sovereignty issue should be ‘shelved’ while the claimants engage in exploring 
the potential for joint development projects and the like in the disputed area. 
Li Mingjiang argues that the Chinese strategy in regards to the South China 
Sea is one of balancing their economic development needs with issues of 
security and sovereignty. As such, the Chinese have promoted greater 
relations with Southeast Asian states, in particular, as they are seen as 
important trade and investment partners for the development of China’s 
economic sector. Likewise, by engaging with the Southeast Asian states 
China can constrain these states in regards to forcing a decision on the 
question of sovereignty, something that could potentially lead to a breakdown 
in relations between the ASEAN claimant states and China. Such tensions 
could also increase the involvement of extra-regional powers such as the 
United States that would be detrimental to Chinese interests.14 
Following a decade of engagement with ASEAN, China has begun to not only 
appreciate the value of the multilateral approach they are actively proposing 
ways to extend this cooperation. The Chinese have been successful in limiting 
the multilateral discussion on the South China Sea to the low politics issues of 
search and rescue, and joint scientific research activity, rather than on any 
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negotiation on issues that would affect the sovereignty claims of the various 
states. However, at the 2006 ASEAN-China Summit in Nanning, the Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao indicated that China was ready to expand its cooperation 
with the ASEAN states to include a military dimension. He called for expanded 
military dialog and exchanges, practical defence cooperation and joint 
development of the South China Sea. He also called for closer collaboration in 
maritime security, search and rescue, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and 
curbing transnational crime.15 However, the Chinese are unlikely to agree to 
any formal attempt to resolve the dispute through multilateral fora as this 
would need to include Taiwan that China does not recognise as an 
independent state. 
 
ASEAN Led Approaches 
There have also been several attempts by the ASEAN states to promote 
diplomatic mechanisms to address the issue. The Chinese occupation of 
Mischief Reef sparked greater interest in the Spratlys among the ASEAN 
states and led to a more coordinated ASEAN response to developments in the 
South China Sea. In 1992 at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila the 
members issued a Declaration on the South China Sea. This ‘Manila 
Declaration’ as it has become known adopted the commitment not to resort to 
force to resolve disputes. The declaration also called on all the claimants to 
exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and not to make any 
provocative or destabilizing moves in the area.16  
In response to the 1994 Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef, the ASEAN 
states once again raised the issue of a common ASEAN position on the South 
China Sea. In the period immediately following the announcement of the 
occupation, the various ASEAN leaders issued statements condemning the 
Chinese actions. The first indication of a growing consensus among the 
ASEAN members was at the ASEAN Defence Cooperation/Coordination 
meeting held in Manila in March 1995. At this meeting, the representatives of 
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the ASEAN member-states issued a statement that reiterated the 1992 Manila 
Declaration and called on the claimants not to make any further moves that 
would destabilise the situation.17  
However, the ASEAN position on the Spratlys is not particularly strong or well 
developed, as there is little consensus among the ASEAN states as to the 
legal status of the Spratlys. The ASEAN attempts to maintain cohesion on the 
Spratlys issue has put an enormous strain on the association. While ASEAN 
is considered an effective regional economic and political grouping, it has not 
been able to match its successes in these fields with any form of conflict 
management mechanism.18 Tension and mistrust is rampant among the 
ASEAN membership and many have not been able to resolve bilateral or 
multilateral disputes over territorial delineation with each other in their own 
territorial waters, let alone in the Spratlys. Each of the ASEAN claimants to the 
Spratlys has as much of a dispute with the other ASEAN claimants as they 
have with China. While being unable to resolve these intra-ASEAN disputes, 
the ASEAN members have been successful in reducing tensions. Indeed the 
ASEAN members have developed an ‘ASEAN Spirit’ among themselves in 
which they have pledged not to use force to resolve their differences and not 
to allow these disputes to interfere with their cooperation on economic and 
political issues.  
The next major milestone was in 2002 with the signing of the ‘Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ between all of the ASEAN 
states and China. While the declaration was in essence a re-statement of the 
1992 Manila Declaration, it was significant in that it was the first time the 
Chinese formally signed on to these principles. While the declaration was 
short of a formal ‘Code of Conduct’ for the region, it was an important step in 
the process towards an eventual resolution to the dispute. During the 
negotiations the major sticking point was over the territorial scope of the 
agreement. China wanted to restrict the agreement to the waters around the 
Spratly Islands while the Vietnamese also wanted to include the Paracel 
Islands.19 The Malaysians were reluctant to include a geographic reference or 
to include a restriction on improving the infrastructure on already occupied 
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features. For Malaysia the concern was that their 1998-99 occupation of 
Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef, which was in technical violation of the 1992 
Manila Declaration, would be raised and they would be pressured to withdraw 
from these features. In the end, no geographic reference was included in the 
declaration except for the title, which implies a broad coverage but is 
sufficiently vague to allow some flexibility for various states. 
 
Bilateral and Trilateral Negotiations 
In addition to the multilateral discussions several bilateral and trilateral 
initiatives have also been developed. These have ranged from bilateral codes 
of conduct for state action in the area to the establishment of bilateral working 
groups to discuss territorial boundary issues. While other claimants have 
engaged each other on a bilateral basis, the primary proponent of the bilateral 
process has been China. The bilateral talks, that China hosts with the other 
claimants, have had some success in reducing tensions, primarily between 
China and Vietnam and China and Malaysia. There is, however, some 
concern over the utility of bilateral discussions between the Chinese and the 
smaller South China Sea littoral states. Jusuf Wanandi, the Chairman of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, warned of the 
dangers of bilateral discussions with China stating that the Chinese ‘will divide 
us and clobber us one by one’.20  
 
Philippines-China 
Despite the Filipino preference for a multilateral approach, they have engaged 
with the Chinese on a number of bilateral agreements. In 2004 the Philippines 
and China agreed to allow their state oil firms to undertake a joint seismic 
exploration in part of their overlapping territorial claims. The agreement was 
signed during a three-day state visit by the Philippines President Gloria Arroyo 
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in early September where the two states also signed an agreement to combat 
illegal fishing in the disputed area.21 In late September of that year the 
Philippine’s Secretary of National Defense, Avelino Cruz stated that China 
and the Philippines had also agreed to establish an annual security dialogue. 
Cruz stated that the purpose of the talks were to ‘pinpoint areas where we can 
have closer cooperation, like exchange of training and mutual help in sea 
disasters’.22 This agreement came under a high degree of scrutiny and 
criticism especially from the press and members of the Philippines legislature 
when its details were leaked to the press in February 2008. The concern was 
that the Philippines effectively surrendered part of its sovereignty to the 
Chinese (and the Vietnamese when the agreement was expanded) by 
including in the joint exploration area parts of the Philippine’s continental shelf 
and EEZ that is not part of any claim by either China or Vietnam. Barry Wain 
argues that ‘[t]hrough its actions, Manila has given a certain legitimacy to 
China’s legally spurious “historic claim” to most of the South China Sea’.23 
 
China-Vietnam 
The Chinese also made conciliatory moves with the Vietnamese. The two 
have created a working group to discuss their joint maritime boundaries. In 
1993 they agreed not to resort to force to settle any of their border disputes on 
land or at sea.24 This was reiterated in May 1995, when Qian Qichen and 
Nguyen Manh Cam, the then foreign ministers of China and Vietnam 
respectively, met in Beijing and issued another statement agreeing on the 
need to settle the territorial disputes in the South China Sea through 
negotiations.25  
This cooperation was expanded when in March 2005 Vietnam agreed to join 
the Chinese-Filipino joint marine seismic surveys. In this, the three national oil 
companies agreed to a three-year Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) 
in a portion of their mutually overlapping claims in the Spratlys.26 In December 
2007 the three cooperating national oil companies announced that they had 
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completed the first phase of the seismic survey covering 11,022 line kms and 
were preparing to conduct the second phase that will cover 11,300 kms after 
‘encouraging’ results from the first phase. In addition, in a meeting between 
Philippine President Arroyo and Chinese Premier Wen at the Leaders Summit 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Singapore the two expressed 
their interest in expanding the joint exploration on a ‘development level’.27 
Again, Barry Wain is critical of the implications of this agreement arguing that 
the Philippines in particular have given up too much. Citing Mark Valencia, 
Wain claims that around one sixth of the joint survey zone is outside any 
Chinese or Vietnamese claimed area.28  
The three states have also agreed to increase cooperation in the area to 
protect their respective fishing fleets from pirate attacks following a May 2006 
incident where four Chinese fishermen were killed in an apparent pirate 
attack. Speaking after a meeting with his Chinese and Vietnamese 
counterparts the Chief of Staff of the Philippines armed forces, General 
Generosa Senga stated that, ‘[w]e have agreed that we will continue our direct 
communication in the area so that these problems ... piracy, smuggling, 
transnational crimes ... can be resolved’.29 
Jörn Dosch argues that Vietnam has become sceptical of the multilateral 
approach based on consensus-building and the non-binding commitment to 
the non-use of force. He argues that for Vietnam, such approaches lost their 
credibility in advancing Vietnam’s interest in the South China Sea, when the 
Philippines signed its bilateral deal with China in 2004. Even though Vietnam 
joined the agreement in 2005, it does not represent a success for the 
diplomatic approach. Rather the agreement demonstrates an international 
environment where the various Southeast Asian states compete in a zero-sum 
environment for Chinese preference and favours.30 Dosch argues that this 
view was confirmed by a Chinese government official who stated that, ‘[w]hen 
we signed the agreement with the Philippines in 2004 it meant that Vietnam 
had fallen behind. And although Vietnam joined the agreement later, we are 
still more advanced in our negotiations with the Philippines. We are also 
speaking to Malaysia but these talks are less developed than those with the 
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Philippines and Vietnam.’31  
This lack of norm building can be seen in the increase in tensions between 
China and Vietnam as recently as December 2007 when China announced 
plans to establish a new administrative zone called Sansha covering the 
Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands and the Macclesfield Bank. To voice their 
displeasure at this, groups of Vietnamese citizens held protests over two 
weekends outside the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and the Consulate in Ho 
Chi Minh City.32 In addition, relations were strained between the two in April 
2007 over a Vietnamese plan to develop the Moc Tinh (Block 5.3) and Hai 
Thach (Block 5.2) gas fields and to build a gas pipeline from these gas fields 
to the Vietnamese mainland. The Chinese protested this development, 
although not in a formal statement but rather in response to a reporter’s 
question during an unrelated press conference. When asked about the 
Vietnamese announcement the then Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Qin 
Gang stated that ‘China has irrefutable sovereignty over the Spratly Islands 
and neighbouring marine areas. With everyone’s hard work, at present the 
situation in the South China Sea is stable. Vietnam’s series of new actions 
[are] infringing on China’s sovereignty, sovereign power and administrative 
rights in the Spratly Islands, [and] goes against the important consensus 
reached by [the] leaders of the two countries on the maritime issue.’33 This 
follows the 2007 Chinese announcement that it would allow PetroChina to drill 
exploration wells in the Huaguang trough area34 and a Vietnamese 
announcement in January 2007 that PetroVietnam would carry out joint 
operations with the US oil company ExxonMobil in an area (Blocks 117, 118 
and 119) which overlaps the PetroChina’s exploration area in the Huaguang 
trough. 
 
Malaysia-China 
Malaysia has been the most supportive of bilateral discussions on the issue 
with China. Malaysia is in a unique situation in that its claim, aside from 
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Brunei, is the farthest away from the Chinese mainland. As such, the 
Malaysians feel that they will be able to retain most, if not all, of their claim 
area under a bilateral deal with China. The then Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad stated in August 1993 that as Malaysia claims ‘only a few 
underwater atolls’ China is willing to discuss the issue in a bilateral meeting.35 
As the Malaysian claim area is so far from China the Malaysian’s are also 
confident that the Chinese would not be able to occupy forcibly the features 
within the Malaysian claim. Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda, the Executive 
Director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre argues that China is not 
a major threat to Malaysia and that he does not envision a scenario in which 
Malaysia would be forced to defend the islands.36 Indeed, in November 2004, 
the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, told the Malaysian Prime Minister that the 
two countries could jointly develop the South China Sea.37 
 
Malaysia-Vietnam 
Malaysia and Vietnam have also increased their bilateral contacts. The two 
have entered into joint development agreements for disputed areas in the Gulf 
of Thailand. Malaysia and Vietnam have also discussed the possibility of 
increasing the level of defence cooperation between them. In March 1996, the 
Malaysian and Vietnamese Prime Ministers agreed to adopt a series of 
confidence-building measures designed to increase the level of transparency 
between the two state’s armed forces. In this they agreed to establish a 
regular pattern of consultations and exchanges of information between the 
armed forces of each state. This is an important building block to develop the 
precedents for even greater military-to-military cooperation such as joint 
exercises. In relation to their respective claims to the Spratlys’ Mahathir in a 
1996 visit to Vietnam, stated that the Spratlys would not be on the agenda of 
the meeting between the two leaders, ‘we have already discussed that. We 
have no dispute. Vietnam has Vietnam’s part and we have ours’.38 
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In 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam cooperated in drafting a joint submission to the 
UN Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) beyond its 
200nm EEZ.39 The submission effectively divides the southern part of the 
South China Sea between the two. China, not surprisingly, responded to this 
by submitting a Note Verbale to the CLCS objecting to the Malaysian-
Vietnamese claims. In its protest, China stated that it ‘has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, 
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well 
as the seabed and subsoil thereof’.40  
While the Chinese protest is not in and of itself assertive (or any more 
assertive than the Malaysian-Vietnamese claim), there are a couple of 
important aspects of the nature of the protest and the implications of the 
wording that was used. First, as part of the protest note China attached the 
1947 9 dashed line map to its submission. This is important as it was the first 
formal use of the map by the Chinese government. Second, this seems to 
clarify the nature of China’s claim. By referring to its sovereignty of ‘the islands 
and adjacent waters’ it appears that the Chinese are referring to 12nm 
territorial seas that could possibly be generated from the features, rather than 
claiming the entire South China Sea as territorial or historic waters.41 While 
the legality of the Spratly features to generate territorial seas (let alone EEZs) 
is highly dubious, the Chinese may be playing a long game by seeking to 
formalise its claim to the features while also seeking to get international 
support in changing international law to allow non-island features to generate 
territorial seas. 
 
Impact on Sino-United States Relations 
The South China Sea dispute has also recently had an impact on Sino-
American relations. In March 2010, it was reported that the Chinese told the 
US that the South China Sea was a “core interest” 42 related to its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (which puts it at the same level as Taiwan and Tibet).43 
13 
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In response to this assertiveness the United States responded with US 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates at the Shangri La dialogue meeting in 
early June 2010 reiterating the US position from 1995 stating ‘[o]ur policy is 
clear: it is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and 
unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not take sides on 
any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and 
actions that hinder freedom of navigation.’44 
This message was repeated by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton at 
the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi on 23 July 2010. Secretary Clinton 
stated that freedom of navigation through the South China Sea was a matter 
of US ‘national interest’. The US also offered support for ‘a collaborative 
diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes 
without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant.’45 
Here both Secretary Gates and Clinton were reiterating long-standing US 
policy on the issue. In 1992 the US Ambassador to the Philippines, Frank 
Wisner stated that the US would oppose the use of force and that it would not 
allow threats to the peace and stability of the area to go unchallenged.46 Later 
that year the then US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security 
Affairs, James Lilley commented that the continuing American military 
presence in the Asia Pacific is an effective deterrent to any aggressive action 
in the Spratlys even though the Americans have no specific treaty 
commitments to act in the area.47 Further statements in 1995 indicated a 
strong American commitment to protect international shipping rights through 
the South China Sea in times of conflict. In May 1995, the State Department 
issued a statement affirming American interests in maintaining peace and 
stability in the area and calling on the claimants to intensify their efforts to 
resolve the dispute peacefully and in accordance to international law. The 
statement also warned that any action restricting maritime activity in the South 
China Sea would be of great concern to the United States.48 Further, in June 
1995 Joseph Nye, the then United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security, warned that should freedom of the seas be threatened 
by any military action in the South China Sea the United States Navy would 
be prepared to escort and protect civilian ships passing through the area.49  
14 
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While the timing of the 2010 US statements was important, more striking was 
who said them and where. That the US Secretary of State raised the issue at 
the ARF was groundbreaking as the Chinese had previously been able to 
prevent states from raising the issue in such a multilateral forum. The Chinese 
criticised the US and the other 12 ARF members that subsequently also 
raised the issue, claiming that the Americans risked inflaming the situation by 
‘internationalising’ what was a bilateral issue.50  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, what does this tell us about the role China sees for itself in the 
region? In many ways, the Chinese behaviour is contradictory. Through 
engagement with the regional actors the Chinese can seek to shape 
multilateral mechanisms to achieve their policy objectives while conceding 
only limited power and influence to the smaller states. However, when 
adopting a confrontational stance the Chinese risk isolating themselves and 
building coalitions against them, but they also send explicit signals as to the 
limits they will allow in any compromise.  
Finally, there is a danger of an over emphasis on China. All the claimant 
states have been provocative at some point and in any sovereignty dispute 
each of the claimants has to both exercise its sovereignty and dispute any 
such actions by others. Moreover, this is not a bilateral issue between China 
and ASEAN. Not all of the ASEAN states are claimants to the Spratlys and 
those that are have not reached agreement among themselves as to 
sovereignty. A peaceful resolution to the South China Sea disputes will only 
be achieved through dialogue between all of the claimants. Whether a third 
party such as the United States or Indonesia or even a regional organisation 
such as ASEAN or the ARF, can facilitate these discussions is a matter for the 
claimants themselves to agree on. In the meantime, China’s actions in the 
South China Sea will continue to be the focus of international attention as a 
bellwether of the nature of China as a regional and indeed global actor. 
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